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Abstract
The present work suggests that sentence processing requires both heuristic and algorithmic processing streams,
where the heuristic processing strategy precedes the algorithmic phase. This conclusion is based on three self-paced
reading experiments in which the processing of two-sentence discourses was investigated, where context sentences
exhibited quantifier scope ambiguity. Experiment 1 demonstrates that such sentences are processed in a shallow
manner. Experiment 2 uses the same stimuli as Experiment 1 but adds questions to ensure deeper processing.
Results indicate that reading times are consistent with a lexical-pragmatic interpretation of number associated with
context sentences, but responses to questions are consistent with the algorithmic computation of quantifier scope.
Experiment 3 shows the same pattern of results as Experiment 2, despite using stimuli with different lexical-
pragmatic biases. These effects suggest that language processing can be superficial, and that deeper processing,
which is sensitive to structure, only occurs if required. Implications for recent studies of quantifier scope ambiguity are
discussed.
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Introduction
Many levels of information have to be integrated during the
complex yet effortless task of language comprehension. For
example, word level meaning must be integrated into a phrase
and sentence, the structure of which must be consistent with
previous context. All this occurs despite the inherent ambiguity
present in language at each of these levels. The question
addressed in the present work is: what are the underlying
mechanisms that allow for language comprehension to occur
so efficiently? Furthermore, how are such mechanisms co-
ordinated?
The interpretation of sentences displaying semantic
ambiguity is presently examined. Sentences of the form Every
kid climbed a tree, which display quantifier scope ambiguity,
have two possible interpretations. Either it is the case that
several trees were climbed (on a reading where, for every kid,
there is a tree, such that the kid climbed it) or just one tree was
climbed (on an analysis where, there is a tree, such that every
kid climbed it). The former reading is called the surface scope
reading, and the latter is called the inverse scope
interpretation. Quantifier scope ambiguous sentences are
interpreted according to the order in which the quantifiers every
and a (known in logic as the universal and existential
quantifiers, respectively) are interpreted. Of note, the two
different readings are characterized according to how many
trees are plausibly inferred in the situation; either there are
several or just one. The surface scope reading (which is
consistent with the surface linear order of the quantifiers in the
sentence) is associated with the inference of several trees;
henceforth called the plural interpretation. In contrast, the
inverse scope reading (where the order of interpretation of the
quantifiers is the inverse of linear order) is associated with the
single interpretation of tree; henceforth called the singular
interpretation. Linguists and philosophers have ascribed the
following notation as a way of representing the intuitive
readings as noted above:
(1) a. (∀x) (x is a kid (∃y) (y is a tree & x climbed y))
[read as: “For every kid x, there is a tree y, such that x
climbed y”]
b. (∃y) (y is a tree & (∀x) (x is a kid x climbed y))
[read as: “There is a tree y, such that for every kid, x, x
climbed y”]
On one common syntactic account, quantifier scope order
preference is represented via quantifier raising, a movement
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operation assumed to occur at the level of Logical Form [1], [2].
If language processing were assumed to operate on a ‘syntax
first’ approach, the ‘deep’ algorithmic computation of scope (as
modeled in (1), or some version thereof) would be expected as
the driving principle for interpreting quantifier scope ambiguous
sentences. ‘Syntax first’ approaches assume that sentences
are immediately analyzed according to their syntactic structure,
without input from other sources of information, such as lexical-
pragmatic knowledge of real-world events, prosodic
constraints, visual context, etc. [3–6]. The sentence structure
interpretation that is preferred is the one that requires the least
amount of structure to build (as in the Minimal Attachment
hypothesis of Frazier & Fodor [3]). In the case of quantifier
scope ambiguous sentences, an analogous Minimal Structure
Hypothesis (as proposed in Dwivedi [7]) would apply at the
level of Logical Form during interpretation. In that case, the
surface scope interpretation should be preferred (see Text S1
in File S1). Although this mechanism of interpretation has often
been called “syntactic,” the more general term algorithmic
computation will be used here given that we have argued
elsewhere that semantic computation is not independent of
grammatical considerations [7–9]. Thus, algorithmic
computation refers to mechanisms that are sensitive to
structural properties of a sentence.
The surface scope preference was revealed in study by
Kurtzman & MacDonald [10]. In an end-of-sentence on-line
acceptability task, they showed that participants preferred
plural continuation sentences such as (2b), after reading
quantifier scope ambiguous sentences such as (2a), rather
than singular continuations as in (2c).
(2) a. Every kid climbed a tree.
b. The trees were in the park.
c. The tree was in the park.
Thus, participants picked the plural continuation sentence as
the better fit with the ambiguous context sentence at about
77% of the time. This result has been replicated in an off-line
norming pre-test, reported in an Event Related Potential (ERP)
study of quantifier scope ambiguity by Dwivedi, Phillps, Einagel
and Baum [11], where the plural continuation was preferred at
rates of about 74%. In addition, Raffray and Pickering [12], in a
picture priming study, showed that overall, the plural
interpretation was the preferred interpretation at about 75% of
the time (although this result was not the focus of their study).
Thus, that surface scope (consistent with a plural continuation)
is preferred for sentences of the form Every kid climbed a tree
is indeed a robust empirical finding.
That being said, a preference for surface scope interpretation
in general has not been fully replicated in several other studies
[13–15]. One potential reason why findings have been
equivocal is that the above-mentioned studies examined
several linguistic factors simultaneously—e.g., type of verb
phrase, type of verb, type of quantifier, order of quantifiers. In
addition, some of the studies also lacked an unambiguous
control condition.
In Dwivedi et al. [11], an ERP language study following up on
the results of Kurtzman and MacDonald [10], care was taken
such that only one surface order with active verbs was used;
thus Every N1 Verbed an N2, was used for critical stimuli. In
addition, only one type of verb phrase (direct object followed by
adjunct, described below), and one type and order of
quantifiers (every followed by a) was used. This ERP study
examined responses to plural and singular continuation
sentences as in (2b,c) which followed quantifier ambiguous
context sentences such as (2a). Context sentences were
presented in their entirety; participants then pressed a button
and after an interstimulus interval of 600 ms, words for the
continuation sentence were presented in the centre of the
screen at a stimulus onset asychrony (SOA) of 600ms. ERP
responses to continuation sentences occurring after quantifier
scope ambiguous contexts were compared to those that
occurred after unambiguous control contexts, which were
Every kid climbed a different tree (unambiguous plural) and
Every kid climbed the same tree (unambiguous singular).
Results indicated there was no neurophysiological evidence for
a preference of the plural continuation. Instead, plural and
singular continuation sentences, following ambiguous context
sentences, patterned together (see Text S2 in File S1). These
exhibited a late sustained negative-going ERP component 900
ms after the presentation of the noun tree(s) in continuation
sentences (2b,c) and lasting throughout the presentation of the
auxiliary verb was/were (for details, see Dwivedi et al. [11]).
This slow negative shift (cf. [16], [17]) was interpreted as a
reflection of the difficult task of interpreting the previous
quantifier scope ambiguous context, which was not fully
interpreted after it was presented, and integrating the
continuation sentence with such an interpretation. As such, the
central claim of Dwivedi et al. [11] was that, at least at very
early stages of linguistic analysis, the parser/brain leaves
quantifier scope ambiguous sentences as only partially
processed, and disambiguation is delayed until further
information arrives in the signal.
Thus, the above mentioned study, with its carefully controlled
design, did not replicate the preference for the plural
continuation sentences. Another possible reason why results
have been difficult to replicate could be due to a factor that has
yet to be examined in the literature on quantifier scope
ambiguity, which is the role of number in event comprehension.
Whereas previous works examined the differing contribution
of theta roles and animacy with respect to participants in
events [18–24], here the claim is that event representations
could have biases regarding the number of participants.
Evidence of different biases with respect to number can be
found in a follow-up items analysis of the off-line norming study
reported in Dwivedi et al. [11]. Briefly, whereas the off-line
preference for the plural continuation (evidence of surface
scope interpretation) was found 74% of the time, a by-items
analysis revealed that not all quantifier scope ambiguous
sentences patterned in the same way. That is, the plural
continuation was judged as the preferred continuation for a
subset of stimuli (such as Every kid climbed a tree) at rates
close to 100%. Another subset of stimuli (such as Every
jeweller appraised a diamond) was judged as plural at rates
closer to 50%. These differing rates of acceptability underline
the importance of the lexical-pragmatic contributions to
meaning. In other words, since these sentences all had exactly
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the same unambiguous syntactic structure, structural
considerations cannot explain why the sentence Every kid
climbed a tree exhibited a strong bias between plural vs.
singular continuations, whereas Every jeweller appraised a
diamond did not. Ostensibly, the explanation would lie in the
differing contributions of the particular N1VN2 lexical items, and
the likely events that accompany the interpretation of KID CLIMB
TREE vs. JEWELLER APPRAISE DIAMOND. Given that experiments
examining quantifier scope ambiguity have not controlled for
different number biases associated with different events, yet
have relied on number interpretation for the disambiguation of
quantifier scope ambiguous sentences (as in 2b,c), it could be
the case that the lack of replication reported in the literature on
quantifier scope ambiguity processing is the result of mixing
stimuli with different biases within and across experiments
(where the term ‘bias’ refers to the empirically observed
interpretation preferences by participants, rather than a
tendency as predicted by an algorithmic parsing strategy, such
as Minimal Attachment). In the present work, self-paced
reading methodology is used to follow up on the previous ERP
language experiment of Dwivedi et al. [11], and importantly,
stimuli are separated with respect to (the above mentioned
empirically observed) number bias as a way of investigating the
role of lexical-pragmatic heuristics in quantifier scope
interpretation.
A well-known example of a heuristic processing strategy is
the N1VN2 strategy [25], [26], which consists of recognizing
that, for the most part, English sentences are structured such
that the first Noun (N1) is the subject of a sentence and the one
following the Verb (N2) is the object. Another example of a
heuristic processing strategy is using the lexical-pragmatic
association of words for interpretation. Note that, in the
literature, this heuristic strategy has alternatively been called
the semantics processing stream, lexical association, semantic
association, and more recently, semantic attraction (for recent
examples, see 27], [28], [21). The idea is that, in the absence
of any grammatical/structural information, representations
regarding events can be computed by simply recognizing the
lexical-pragmatic association of words alone, e.g., BOY EAT APPLE
will always be understood as an apple-eating event by a boy.
This sort of event interpretation relies on experience with the
real-world; it is independent of grammatical computation.
Recent ERP language work by Chwilla and Kolk [29] showed
that when the final word in a triplet is unexpected (e.g., VACATION
TRIAL DISMISSAL vs. DIRECTOR BRIBE DISMISSAL) an N400 component
is elicited, where this waveform is a marker of lexical-pragmatic
anomaly [30], [31]. Thus, even without grammatical cues,
simple word triplets can result in an event interpretation (also
known as a script or schema, [32], [33]). Consequently, the
language processor can posit an event interpretation by quickly
scanning incoming linguistic material via simple word
recognition, without consulting detailed syntactic and semantic
rules of computation. This would result in a ‘good enough’
representation, using ‘quick and dirty’ heuristic processing
strategies only [25–27], [34–40].
In sum, two possible routes for sentence interpretation have
been proposed for language processing. For our purposes,
quantifier scope ambiguous sentences could be interpreted by
either a (deep) algorithmic computation, modeled on (1),
sensitive to structural analysis (see Text S3 in File S1), or a
(shallow) ‘quick and dirty’ lexical-pragmatic heuristic processing
strategy, which is independent of structural considerations.
Next, it is an open question as to how these two independent
processing streams interact. That is, does one processing
stream apply before the other, or do these streams work in
parallel (cf. [41], [21]), such that they continuously affect each
other? The timing of the application of these streams is up for
debate. In contrast to the ‘syntax first’ approach discussed
above, recent ERP language work suggests that these streams
work in parallel, where the stream with the strongest cue
determines whether a P600 effect (evidence of structural
processing) vs. an N400 effect (evidence of lexical-pragmatic
bias) occurs. However, although ERP methods are renowned
for the moment-by-moment timing information that can be
gleaned, the standard rate of presentation of words in most
ERP language experiments is quite slow (between 300-600 ms
per word). As a result, even if the quick and dirty lexical-
pragmatic heuristic were to apply in say, the first 300 ms of
perception, the slow rate of word presentation would allow for
the second phase of algorithmic computation to begin to apply.
This would end up looking like parallel and interactive
processing as a result. The key is to use a method that does
not constrain rate of presentation, so that language processing
can apply more “naturally” (modulo a laboratory setting).
Furthermore if heuristic and algorithmic phases are ordered
sequentially, then measurements at both early and late points
of processing are necessary as a way of capturing these
independent streams of processing.
Thus, in the present work, the shallow processing claim
regarding quantifier scope ambiguous sentences in Dwivedi et
al. [11] is extended and clarified, especially with respect to
issues regarding the independent processing streams involving
lexical-pragmatic heuristic strategies vs. algorithmic
computation and their respective timing. It could be the case
that the daunting aspect of quantifier scope interpretation (see
1) results in a processing strategy that only uses a quick and
dirty lexical-pragmatic heuristic when dealing with quantifier
scope ambiguous sentences, (see Text S4 in File S1). In other
words, the deep algorithmic computation could occur later than
the heuristic strategy (cf. 26) and perhaps only if demanded by
a task. Thus, it could be the case that participants did not
resolve the meaning of quantifier scope ambiguous sentences
in Dwivedi et al. [11] because they were never asked to do so
(see Text S5 in File S1); only superficial content questions
were used in filler trials. This is consistent with the claim made
in Swets et al. [38], where it was shown that readers are
strategic in terms of how they interpret sentences; for some
constructions, readers process deeply only when required to do
so. Thus, the experiments below independently investigate the
role of task modulation and lexical-pragmatic biases in
sentences exhibiting quantifier scope ambiguity. In doing so,
these experiments will build on the ERP findings of Dwivedi et
al. [11] and clarify how sentences are interpreted and
integrated into semantically ambiguous contexts. Furthermore,
the hypothesis that language processing does not invoke deep
algorithmic processing (unless required to do so) will be
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investigated. The stimuli under investigation are carefully
modeled after previously published works [10–12], using stimuli
biases from Dwivedi et al. [11]. The factors of interest are
Context (2 levels: Ambiguous, Unambiguous) and Number (2
levels: Plural, Singular). See Table 1 for samples of
experimental stimuli.
In the first experiment, sentences that are heavily biased
(93-100%) for the plural continuations (consistent with surface
scope interpretation) are presented in a self-paced reading
study. If heuristic and algorithmic processing streams occur in
parallel, then a strong bias in favour of plural continuation
sentences should occur (see Text S6 in File S1). Therefore,
reading times (RTs) for plural conditions when following
ambiguous contexts should not differ from those following
unambiguous contexts (since both are congruent with
expectations). In contrast, the singular continuation sentence
should exhibit longer RTs following ambiguous contexts than
those following unambiguous singular control contexts, since
the plural interpretation would be expected after ambiguous
contexts. Furthermore, given the lateness of the effect found in
the previous ERP experiment [11], effects should occur
towards the end of the continuation sentence. On the other
hand, on a heuristic first model, shallow processing of the
context sentence could result in superficial processing of the
continuation sentence, such that no real integration occurs.
This would result in a lack of a difference between continuation
sentences.
In the second experiment, the same heavily biased stimuli
are used but are now followed by explicit questions regarding
the interpretation of sentences. These questions should
modulate the depth of processing so that participants now pay
attention, and an effort to integrate continuation sentences
should occur. If heuristic and algorithmic processing streams
occur in parallel, data should pattern as predicted for
Experiment 1; in fact, deeper processing could result in an
enhancement of the predicted RT difference expected for
singular continuations following ambiguous contexts (vs.
unambiguous control singular contexts). Question-response
accuracy will also yield information regarding participants’
actual interpretation of sentences. A difference between
ambiguous singular vs. unambiguous singular conditions is
expected, such that accuracy rates should be lower for the
ambiguous singular condition; whereas response accuracy for
ambiguous plural should be quite high, and unambiguous plural
conditions should reflect accuracy rates close to ceiling. In
Table 1. Sample Critical Stimuli.
 Context
Number
(continuation) Ambiguous Unambiguous
Plural Every kid climbed a tree.The trees were in the park.
Every kid climbed those trees.
The trees were in the park.
Singular Every kid climbed a tree.The tree was in the park.
Every kid climbed that tree. The
tree was in the park.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.t001
other words, the pattern of responses for RTs and question-
response accuracy should be similar.
Alternatively, if the heuristic phase precedes the algorithmic
phase in terms of timing, then the pattern found for on-line
reading would differ from that found for mean question-
response accuracy. In this case, the prediction is that the self-
paced reading time data, representative of the quick and dirty
heuristic phase, would only reflect the lexical-pragmatic biases
of the stimuli. This would result in an effect of Number at the
continuation sentence, where singular sentences would take
longer to read than plural sentences. No effect of ambiguity is
expected on this account, since the lexical pragmatic bias in
this experiment only concerns Number. However, the question-
response accuracy rates should still result in the ambiguous
singular condition having the lowest accuracy rate of all
conditions, since this task would require algorithmic
interpretation.
Experiment 3 follows up on the findings of Experiment 2; it
involves stimuli without a strong lexical-pragmatic bias, such
that these sentences are truly ambiguous with respect to
quantifier scope interpretation (e.g., Every jeweller appraised a
diamond). Should heuristic and algorithmic strategies occur in
parallel, patterns found in on-line RT data should mirror
question-response accuracy. On this view, given that there is
no strong lexical-pragmatic cue for interpreting scope
ambiguous context sentences in Experiment 3 [28], [41], the
algorithmic stream should immediately do the work to
disambiguate the meaning of context sentences, resulting in a
surface scope preference. As a consequence, the singular
continuation following ambiguous contexts should be
dispreferred, resulting in longer RTs and lowest accuracy rates
in response to questions. Thus, on-line RTs and question-
response accuracy should yield similar patterns in both
Experiments 2 and 3, such that findings indicate that the
ambiguous singular condition is dispreferred, on an account
where both heuristic and algorithmic processing streams occur
in parallel.
In contrast, if the heuristic phase precedes the algorithmic
phase, then a different data pattern is expected to be observed
for reading times vs. question-response accuracy responses.
Namely, reading time data at continuation sentences should
reflect the lexical-pragmatic biases of the stimuli; in Experiment
3, now an effect of Context is predicted. That is, sentences
following ambiguous contexts should take longer to read than
those embedded in unambiguous contexts, since the former
context is more complex. Crucially, no effect of Number is
predicted here, since that is not part of the lexical-pragmatic
bias in this experiment. Furthermore, whereas patterns
associated with RTs are expected to differ from Experiment 2,
question-response accuracy rates should not. The algorithmic
computation is only sensitive to structural considerations and
should be independent of lexical-pragmatic biases. In other
words, RT results in Experiment 3 should differ from those of
Experiment 2 (reflecting the different lexical-pragmatic bias),
but question-response accuracy rates should not (reflecting the
same algorithmic computation). See Table 2 for an overview of
the experiments in the present work.
Investigating Quantifier Scope Ambiguity
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Experiment 1
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement.  This study received ethics approval from
the Brock University Social Science Research Ethics Board
(SREB) prior to the commencement of the experiment (REB
07-293). Written, informed consent was received from all
participants prior to their participation in the experiment.
Participants.  Eighty right-handed native speakers of
English (59 female, mean age 22 years, range 18 to 34 years)
were recruited at Brock University and were either paid $10
each to participate in the experiment or were given partial
course credit (if applicable).
Materials.  Twenty-four experimental stimuli were prepared
such that each consisted of 2 sentences: a context sentence
(Sentence 1, S1) and a continuation sentence (Sentence 2,
S2). See Table 1. The context sentence always began with
Every NP as a subject, and the direct object was either a Noun
Phrase (NP) preceded by an existential quantifier (a) for
ambiguous contexts, or a referential determiner (that/those) for
unambiguous contexts. The use of these determiners would
ensure that no scope ambiguity could occur with these
conditions [42] (see Text S7 in File S1). The continuation
sentences began with a singular or plural subject NP and
auxiliary verb (The tree(s) was/were; the melon(s) was/were),
followed by either a prepositional phrase (in the park) or
conjoined adjectives (soft and juicy).
The 24 experimental items were combined with 64 stimuli
from an unrelated experiment, and 64 fillers, for a total of 152
items. Four lists were created in order to ensure that the
conditions were counterbalanced as per Latin square design. In
order to ensure that participants were paying attention to the
experiment, the 64 filler items were followed by simple
questions pertaining to their superficial content. The questions
were forced choice, with two buttons (labeled as “1” and “2”)
Table 2. Overview of Experiments in the Present Work.
Experiment Lexical-Pragmatic bias? Task demands?
1 yes no
2 yes yes
3 no yes
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.t002
designated for answer selection. An example stimulus/question
pair is shown in (3):
(3) Because of the thunderstorm, Lara had trouble sleeping.
She felt terrible the next day.
Did Lara sleep well? 1) Yes 2) No
Participants pressed the button that corresponded to the
answer on the screen. Answers were counterbalanced such
that equal numbers of correct answers were displayed on the
right and left side of the screen.
The 24 items used in the present study were 93-100%
plurally biased, i.e., heavily biased for surface scope
interpretation (see Critical Stimuli List S1 in File S1 for a list of
critical stimuli and biases). These sentences were selected
from a previous off-line study reported in Dwivedi et al. [11].
Two semi-randomized lists were created, and 32 subjects
(none of whom participated in the present experiment) read
ambiguous context sentences as above, and were asked to
circle the preferred continuation sentence (see Figure 1). In this
off-line task, discourses were presented in a booklet in a
pseudo-random order, with the constraint that no more than
two of the same type of trial succeeded one another. In each
list, 80 ambiguous context sentences were presented, as well
as 80 unambiguous ones (40 unambiguous singular and 40
unambiguous plural). Note that plural and singular continuation
sentence choices were counterbalanced to appear either on
the top or bottom position. In addition, 80 fillers were used from
an unrelated experiment. Results were consistent with those of
Kurtzman and MacDonald [10], such that the plural
continuation sentence The trees were in the park was preferred
for Ambiguous contexts such as Every kid climbed a tree 74%
of the time. For the current study, an items analysis was
conducted. Results indicated that not all items were biased in
the same way, such that the plural preference ranged from
20-100%. Sentences most heavily biased for plural
interpretation were used for this (and the following) experiment.
Procedure.  The on-line task involved self-paced reading,
word-by-word, with a moving window display [43] (see Text S8
in File S1). All non-space characters of both the context
sentence (S1) and the continuation sentence (S2) were
presented on one screen masked by dash symbols (-). S2
always began on a new line on the left margin adhered to by
S1, and the same applied for lengthy sentences which
occupied more than one line. Participants pressed a button to
advance from word to word, such that only one word was
Figure 1.  Example of an ambiguous pre-test item in Dwivedi et al. (2010).  Participants were instructed to circle the
continuation sentence (e.g. The roads were flat and paved or The road was flat and paved) that best fit with the first sentence (e.g.
Every schoolgirl crossed a road).
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.g001
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visible on the screen at a time. Reading time was recorded as
the time between button presses. Before starting the
experiment, participants practiced on a short list of items in
order to familiarize themselves with task requirements.
E-Prime software was used to present the self-paced reading
task. A 19” widescreen Dell LCD monitor was approximately
18-24 inches from the participant, level with the participant’s
point of view. The order of sentence presentation was
randomized per participant by E-Prime software. Participant
responses were recorded via a PSTnet serial response button
box.
Results
Data were filtered such that any data point that was more
than 2 standard deviations away from the mean (within subject,
condition, and word position) in either direction was attenuated
to the nearest ceiling value. This affected less than 2% of the
data.
All statistical analyses concerned reading times recorded per
word at S1 and S2. Analyses were also conducted using
residual reading times (RRT; see 4], [44). Because the pattern
of results obtained for RRT analyses was exactly analogous to
the raw RT data, the results are reported with respect to the
latter dependent variable only.
The reading time analyses were based on PASW (see Text
S9 in File S1) v18 statistical software and the Greenhouse-
Geisser [45] non-sphericity correction was employed for effects
with more than one degree of freedom in the numerator.
Following convention, unadjusted degrees of freedom are
reported, along with adjusted p-values. Mean square error
values reported are those corresponding to the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction. All significant main effects, by participants
and by items [46], involving the factors of interest (Context and
Number) are reported first, followed by the highest order
interaction effects involving Context and/or Number. Effect size
is reported using partial eta squared, ŋp2.
Separate repeated measure ANOVAs were conducted for S1
and S2.
Comprehension question performance.  The mean
question-response accuracy for participants was at 96%,
indicating that participants were indeed paying attention.
Reading times at context sentence (S1).  Given that
ambiguous vs. unambiguous context sentences are exactly
alike until after the verb, analyses were run at the final word of
S1, tree(s). This ANOVA was defined by the within-subjects
factors of Context (2 levels: ambiguous vs. unambiguous) and
Number (2 levels: plural vs. singular). A main effect of Context
was found; this was significant by participants but not by items
(F1 (1,79) = 12.14, MSE = 7644; p = .001, ŋp2=.133; F2 (1,23) =
176, MSE = 19954, p =.19, ŋp2=.071). Reading times to
unambiguous contexts took 34 ms longer than ambiguous
contexts, i.e., 460ms vs. 426ms. No other effects were
significant.
Reading times at continuation sentence (S2).  A repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted for the whole sentence at
S2. Word positions in the whole sentence were analyzed
because at the face of it, it is unclear where effects might
occur. On the one hand, one could expect integration and
interpretation to occur at the subject noun position tree(s),
since once that anaphor is perceived, it needs to be linked with
the previous discourse [47], [48]. However, given the lateness
of the effect noted in previous work, effects could also occur at
the end of the sentence. Thus, besides Context and Number,
Word Position was a factor in this analysis (6 levels:
Det^N^Verb^V1^V2^V3, i.e., The^tree(s)^was/
were^in^the^park). As is evident in Figure 2, no significant
effects or interactions were found for Context or Number (all
Fs<2) in any region of the continuation sentence.
Discussion
The goal of this experiment was to investigate whether
empirical differences could be found between plural vs.
singular continuation sentences following quantifier scope
ambiguous contexts. It was predicted that the strong lexical-
pragmatic bias for the plural continuation for quantifier scope
ambiguous sentences (in addition to the same preference for
algorithmic computation, should it have applied) would result in
the ambiguous singular continuation sentences taking more
time to read. Nevertheless, in the experiment above, no
differences were found in any continuation sentence, despite
the heavily biased stimuli. Clearly, the algorithmic work of
scope computation did not occur in real-time. However, it is
unclear why results did not reflect heuristic processes—why
didn’t plural continuation sentences take less time to read than
singular sentences? The lack of a difference found for
continuation sentences can be explained using claims in
Hannon and Daneman [49], which also examined sentence
processing in context. That work suggested that once shallow
processing is adopted, which is precisely the processing
strategy suggested for scope ambiguous sentences (see
Dwivedi et al. [11]), then “the comprehension system may
assume coherence as a default, as long as there is sufficient
global coherence,” ([49],p. 459; [50]). In other words, once the
continuation sentence arrives, no real effort is made for
integration, since the interpretation at the context sentence is
so shallow. This lack of attention results in a lack of difference
for reading times at continuation sentences.
The only difference found was between ambiguous and
unambiguous context sentences at S1, whereby participants
spent more time reading the unambiguous context sentences
than scope ambiguous sentences at the final word. Although
this was significant by participants and not by items, it is a
pattern that will be observed again, and so deserves discussion
here.
The difference at the first sentence was not expected. Two
possible explanations emerge. First, it could be the case that
participants spend less time at ambiguous vs. unambiguous
context sentences because they underspecify these sentences.
That is, one way of looking at the data would be to claim that
quantifier scope ambiguous sentences are read more quickly
than unambiguous ones. This proposal would be congruent
with the findings of Traxler, Pickering, and Clifton [51] and
Swets et al. [38], where ambiguous sentences were shown to
have shorter reading times than unambiguous sentences. A
faster reading time is consistent with shallow processing of
quantifier scope ambiguous sentences.
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Another possible explanation does exist, however. It could
be the case that participants are spending more time at the
unambiguous context because this context uses the referential
NPs that/those tree(s). Given that these sentences were not
preceded by any other linguistic material, that/those tree(s)
does not actually refer to anything. As such, it could be the
case that the significant difference in reading time for
participants is their ability to notice this discourse pragmatic
anomaly. Future experiments are planned where S1 is
preceded by a context sentence to further investigate this
finding.
In Experiment 2, we use the same stimuli (biased for plural)
as in Experiment 1, but now participants are given the strategic
goal of having to answer questions regarding the interpretation
of the two-sentence discourse just read. It is hypothesized that
the presence of the questions will force participants to pay
more attention to the discourse, such that effort to integrate
continuation sentences will be made.
Experiment 2
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement.  This study received ethics approval from
the Brock University Social Science Research Ethics Board
(SREB) prior to the commencement of the experiment (REB
07-293). Written, informed consent was received from all
participants prior to their participation in the experiment.
Participants.  Forty-eight right-handed native speakers of
English (39 female, mean age 20.8 years, range 18 to 30
years) were recruited at Brock University and were either paid
$10 each to participate in the experiment or were given partial
course credit (if applicable).
Materials.  The 24 biased target materials were the same as
those in Experiment 1. These materials were combined with 64
stimuli from an unrelated experiment, and 101 fillers, for a total
of 189 items. Target sentences were divided into four lists,
ensuring that all factors were counterbalanced in Latin square
format. All trials were followed by a question. That is, in
addition to all filler trials being followed by questions (unlike
Experiment 1, where this was the case for half), all target
sentences were now followed by questions that directly queried
their interpretation, as in
(4) Every kid climbed a tree.
The trees were in the park.
How many trees were climbed? 1) Several 2) One
All questions were forced choice, with two buttons (labeled
as “1” and “2”) designated for answer selection. Participants
pressed the button that corresponded to the answer on the
screen. Answers were counterbalanced such that an equal
number of correct answers were displayed on the right and left
hand side of the screen. The target sentences used were
exactly the same as in Experiment 1. See Critical Stimuli List
S1 in Supporting Information for a complete list of stimuli.
Figure 2.  Reading time in milliseconds at both S1 and S2 in Experiment 1 (N=80).  Points represent mean RTs per word, with
vertical lines depicting the standard error of the means.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.g002
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Procedure.  The procedure in the present experiment was
analogous to Experiment 1 (see Text S10 in File S1).
Results
Data filtering was completed as in Experiment 1; this affected
less than 1% of the data. All statistical analyses were
conducted as in Experiment 1.
Reading times at context sentence (S1).  Analyses at the
final word of S1 again revealed a main effect of Context (F1 (1,
47) = 6.91, MSE = 43931; p = 0.012; ŋp2=.128; F2 (1, 23) =
22.21, MSE = 7127; p < 0.001; ŋp2=.491).
Overall, the unambiguous context sentence took more time
to read than the ambiguous contexts (545ms vs. 465ms). See
Figure 3.
Reading times at continuation sentence (S2).  A repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted at the second sentence
(S2), exactly as in Experiment 1. There were no main effects
associated with Context or Number (Fs<2). There was a
significant interaction between Number x Word Position ((F1 (5,
235) = 6.24, MSE = 58577; p < .001; ŋp2=.117; F2 (5,115) =
5.84, MSE = 7617; p < .001; ŋp2=.202). Simple effects analyses
revealed that the final word (park) took 61ms longer to read in
Singular vs. Plural conditions (607ms vs. 545ms), as is evident
in Figure 4. Interestingly, there were no significant interactions
with Context (Fs<2).
Question answer results.  As is shown in Figure 5,
participants performed at levels nearly equivalent to chance
(47%) when responding to the ambiguous singular condition.
That is, when answering How many trees were climbed? after
having just read a singular continuation sentence embedded in
an ambiguous context, participants did extremely poorly. In
contrast, the mean accuracy level for the ambiguous plural
condition was 83%. Both of these accuracy rates differed
significantly from their unambiguous controls, as revealed in
paired-samples t-tests (see Figure 5). Note that there is a clear
bias towards accuracy in the plural conditions vs. the singular
conditions; accuracy for the unambiguous singular condition
was at 71% vs. 94% for the unambiguous plural. Furthermore,
the lower accuracy rates for the singular conditions cannot be
explained via a speed-accuracy trade off. Figure 6 shows that
singular conditions took more time to respond to than plural
conditions (see Text S11 in File S1).
Discussion
To summarize the results above, in Experiment 2, results at
S1 were similar to those of Experiment 1. That is, a difference
at the end of unambiguous vs. ambiguous context sentences
Figure 3.  Reading time in milliseconds at S1 in Experiment 2 (N=48).  Points represent the mean RTs per word; vertical lines
depict standard error of the means.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.g003
Investigating Quantifier Scope Ambiguity
PLOS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 November 2013 | Volume 8 | Issue 11 | e81461
was found again, such that the former took longer to read.
Furthermore, the addition of questions in this experiment
resulted in a reading time difference at the end of S2 for plural
vs. singular sentences. Finally, participants’ response accuracy
rates were at or slightly below chance for the ambiguous
singular condition. Implications of these results are discussed
below.
Context sentence (S1).  The fact that the final region for
scope ambiguous context sentences (a tree) took less time to
read than the unambiguous conditions (that/those trees) in the
present experiment and in Experiment 1 discounts the
hypothesis that participants took less time at ambiguous
contexts because they were not paying attention to these due
to underspecification. In the present experiment, task demands
required that participants pay more attention to both context
and continuation sentences. Under an analysis employed by
Swets et al. [38], one might predict that the S1 difference would
be mitigated in Experiment 2 because participants tend to
spend more time attending to stimuli where they know they will
be asked a question. However, instead the pattern of results
looks just like Experiment 1. Thus, the difference found at S1
seems to be due to the discourse anomaly associated with
using that and those in unambiguous control contexts. While
this finding is of interest in its own right, it is orthogonal to the
question at hand.
Continuation sentence (S2) and question-response
accuracy rates.  Unlike the findings of Experiment 1 and
Dwivedi et al. [11], a difference between singular and plural
continuation sentences was found in Experiment 2. Singular
continuation sentences took longer to read at the final word, as
compared to plural continuation sentences. There was no
effect of quantifier scope ambiguity. Thus, the reading time
pattern of continuation sentences mirrored the lexical-
pragmatic bias of the context sentence. That is, note that
context sentences were heavily biased for the plural
interpretation (as per previous off-line results). However,
question-response accuracy patterns were markedly different.
The ambiguous singular condition was responded to at equal
or slightly below chance levels. Given that participants had just
read the singular continuation sentence The tree was in the
park, it is striking that college-aged students should have
performed so poorly when interpreting this question. This
pattern of results is consistent with a heuristic first, algorithmic
second model of language processing. The hypothesis is that
by the end of the continuation sentence, only lexical-pragmatic
heuristics have applied. That is, the algorithmic parsing
strategy does not apply at all during on-line reading. However,
Figure 4.  Reading time in milliseconds at S2 in Experiment 2 (N=48).  Points represent mean RTs per word; vertical lines depict
the standard error of the means.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.g004
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once the question task arrives, the algorithmic computation
becomes necessary. The considerably low accuracy rate for
this condition reflects how the inverse scope interpretation is
highly dispreferred, given an algorithmic parsing strategy such
as Minimal Attachment. Thus, the pattern of results for
Experiment 2 is consistent with a model of language
comprehension where a ‘quick and dirty’ lexical-pragmatic
phase first attends to linguistic material during on-line reading,
followed by a deeper algorithmic parsing phase, which only
applies because it was required by the question task.
Experiment 3 further examines this claim by testing stimuli
with a different lexical-pragmatic bias for the plural continuation
but with exactly the same unambiguous syntactic structure. If
the hypothesis regarding the timing of the application of these
independent processing streams is correct, then like Expeiment
2, results for Experiment 3 should show a different pattern for
on-line RTs as compared to question-response accuracy data.
Experiment 3
Materials and Methods
Ethics statement.  This study received ethics approval from
the Brock University Social Science Research Ethics Board
(SREB) prior to the commencement of the experiment (REB
07-293). Written, informed consent was received from all
participants prior to their participation in the experiment.
Participants.  Forty right-handed native speakers of English
(32 female, mean age 20.2 years, range 18 to 25 years) were
recruited at Brock University and were either paid $10 each to
participate in the experiment or were given partial course credit
(if applicable).
Materials.  The structure of the materials was comparable to
Experiments 1 and 2. The 24 ambiguous context sentences
were selected from a previous off-line study reported in
Dwivedi et al. [11], as was done for Experiments 1 and 2. The
only difference here in Experiment 3 was that the 24 items
used in the present study were 44-67% plurally biased, i.e.,
unbiased (see Critical Stimuli List S2 in File S1 for a complete
list of critical stimuli). A sample is shown in Table 3.
Procedure.  The procedure in the present experiment was
identical to Experiment 2.
Results
Data were filtered using the same procedure as in
Experiments 1 and 2; this affected less than 2% of the data.
All statistical analyses reported concern raw reading times
recorded per word at the context sentence (S1) and
continuation sentence (S2; note that residual reading time
analyses yielded parallel results).
Separate repeated measures mixed ANOVAs were
conducted for S1 and S2.
Reading times at context sentence (S1).  There was a
main effect of Context (F1 (1, 39) = 5.88, MSE = 20587; p =
0.023; ŋp2=.125; F2 (1, 23) = 3.05, MSE = 21617; p = 0.09; ŋp2=.
117). In addition, there was a Context x Number interaction (F1
Figure 5.  Mean comprehension question accuracy in Experiment 2 (N=48).  Vertical lines depict standard error of the means,
and the horizontal line indicates an accuracy score of 50% (chance). The difference between accuracy for unambiguous and
ambiguous singular stimuli was significant at p < .001. The difference between accuracy for unambiguous and ambiguous plural
stimuli was also significant at p < .001. ***p < .001.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.g005
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 (1, 39) = 8.73, MSE = 18832; p = 0.005; ŋp2=.183; F2 (1,23) =
6.77, MSE = 14939; p =.016; ŋp2=.227). See Figure 7.
Overall, the unambiguous context took more time to read
than the ambiguous contexts (439ms vs. 394ms, p = .02),
much like what was seen in Experiments 1 and 2. However, in
Experiment 3 this result is driven by the Context x Number
interaction, where the unambiguous singular condition (that
diamond) took 88ms more time to read than a diamond (p = .
001) and 59 ms more time to read than those diamonds (p = .
01). This effect is what drives the difference to occur earlier
(see Figure 7) such that the significant differences now occur at
the determiner position that.
Reading times at continuation sentence (S2).  A repeated
measures ANOVA was conducted at the second sentence
(S2), using the same criteria as in Experiments 1 and 2. There
were no main effects associated with Context or Number
(Fs<2). There was a significant interaction between Context x
Word Position (F1 (5, 195) = 3.60, MSE = 1350; p = .011; ŋp2=.
085; F2 (5,115) = 4.81, MSE = 10624; p = .007; ŋp2=.173).
Simple effects analyses revealed that the final word (e.g.,
flawless) takes 50 ms longer to read in the ambiguous
condition as compared to the unambiguous condition (579ms
vs. 529ms). No other word positions showed any significant
differences. Interestingly, there were no significant interactions
with Number (Fs<2). See Figure 8.
Question answer results.  Figure 9 shows that participants
performed at below chance levels again (down to 42%) when
responding to the ambiguous singular condition. In contrast,
the mean accuracy level for the ambiguous plural condition
was 87% (see Text S12 in File S1). As Figure 10 shows, this
difference in accuracy was not due to a speed-accuracy trade
off, since singular conditions again took more time than plural
conditions (see Text S13 in File S1). Both singular and plural
question-response accuracy rates again differed significantly
from their controls, as revealed in paired-samples t-tests (see
Figure 9). The same bias towards accuracy in the plural
conditions vs. the singular conditions was found; accuracy for
the unambiguous singular condition was at 71% vs. 95% for
the unambiguous plural (note that these values are almost
exactly the same as those found in Experiment 2).
Table 3. Sample Critical Stimuli for Experiment 3
(unbiased).
 Context
Number
(continuation) Ambiguous Unambiguous
Plural
Every jeweller appraised a
diamond. The diamonds
were clear and flawless.
Every jeweller appraised those
diamonds. The diamonds were
clear and flawless.
Singular
Every jeweller appraised a
diamond. The diamond was
clear and flawless.
Every jeweller appraised that
diamond. The diamond was clear
and flawless.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.t003
Figure 6.  Mean comprehension question-response time in Experiment 2 (N=48).  Vertical lines depict standard error of the
means.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.g006
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Discussion
To summarize the results above, in Experiment 3, results at
S1 were similar to those of Experiments 1 and 2, where
unambiguous context sentences took longer to read than
ambiguous ones; in the present case, this effect was driven by
the unambiguous singular condition. In addition, a reading time
difference at S2 was found again, where it was consistent with
the lexical-pragmatic bias of the stimuli. As such, ambiguous
continuation sentences took longer to read than unambiguous
sentences. Finally, despite the fact that the stimuli used in
Experiment 3 were relatively unbiased, participants’ response
accuracy rates were exactly the same as they were for
Experiment 2: again, participants’ responses to ambiguous
singular conditions occurred at below chance levels. The
implication of these results is discussed in turn below.
Context sentence (S1).  Results at the first sentence mostly
mirrored those found in Experiments 1 and 2 with a twist: the
longer RTs for the unambiguous contexts seemed to be driven
by the unambiguous singular condition, e.g., Every jeweller
appraised that diamond. The longer RTs found for Experiments
1 and 2 at S1 were explained in the Discussion of Experiment 2
—there is a discourse-pragmatic anomaly effect associated
with the referential determiners that and those. In the present
experiment, this effect is mainly driven by that. This result
makes sense, given that participants do not have strong
lexical-pragmatic biases with scenarios associated with
JEWELLER APPRAISE DIAMOND (as opposed to KID CLIMB TREE). Filik,
Sanford, and Leuthold [52] showed in an ERP language study
that more effort is required to search and integrate a referential
singular item into a discourse than a plural item, since plural
reference is often non-specific. That is, singular pronouns
(s/he) that did not have explicit antecedents produced larger
N400 amplitudes than plural pronouns (they) without explicit
antecedents. e.g., compare pronominal reference in He served
coffee at the event vs. They served coffee at the event.
Referential determiners perform the same linguistic and
cognitive function in discourse as do pronouns (see Postal [53],
who claimed that pronouns are in fact, determiners). As such,
in the absence of any previous context Every jeweller
appraised that diamond vs. Every jeweller appraised those
diamonds results in longer reading times for the singular
condition because that diamond picking out a singular item is
pragmatically more odd in less well-defined scenarios from a
discourse perspective. This is in contrast to the non-specific
plural NP those diamonds. Thus, results at context sentences
for Experiment 3 further bolster the explanation that the
Figure 7.  Reading time in milliseconds at S1 in Experiment 3 (N=40).  Points represent the mean RTs per word; vertical lines
depict standard error of the means.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.g007
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difference found between scope ambiguous vs. unambiguous
context sentences in the present work is a difference that is
due to discourse-pragmatic anomaly.
Continuation sentence (S2) and question-response
accuracy.  Regarding the effects at S2, a complexity effect
was found where continuation sentences embedded in
ambiguous sentences exhibited significantly longer RTs at the
final word position as compared to those embedded in
unambiguous contexts. In other words, like the number effect
found in Experiment 2, results were consistent with the lexical-
pragmatic biases of the context sentence. Thus, unlike
Experiment 2, no difference was found for plural vs. singular
continuation sentences. This makes sense if the RT data
pattern for continuation sentences in Experiments 2 and 3 is in
keeping with the (empirically observed) off-line biases of the
context sentences— continuation sentences that are
incongruent with lexical-pragmatic bias associated with the
context sentence take longer to read. When the context is
heavily biased for plural interpretation (Exp 2), singular
conditions took longer to read. When context sentences are
unbiased (Exp. 3), that is, they are truly ambiguous, then
continuation sentences take longer to read when embedded in
ambiguous vs. unambiguous contexts.
Results regarding question-answer response accuracy rates
again did not pattern like those found for on-line reading times.
That is, participants performed at below chance when
answering questions to ambiguous singular conditions, and
overall did much better answering questions following plural vs.
singular conditions. Thus, accuracy rates again reflected
biases associated with algorithmic parsing. This is in contrast
to continuation sentence reading times, which, once more,
reflected the lexical-pragmatic biases of the stimuli. The
message to take away here is clear—even though the
frequency of expectation regarding interpretation was quite
different in Experiment 3 vs. Experiment 2, ultimate
interpretation was exactly the same. This finding further
underlines the importance of measuring participants’ actual
interpretation of sentences, in addition to their reading times
(see Ferreira [27] for similar claims).
General Discussion
The present study examined the integration of sentences in
discourses where context sentences exhibited quantifier scope
ambiguity. The goal was to extend and clarify the claim that
quantifier scope ambiguous sentences are processed in a
Figure 8.  Reading time in milliseconds at S2 in Experiment 3 (N=40).  Points represent the mean RTs per word; vertical lines
depict standard error of the means.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.g008
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shallow manner, and to use these underspecified constructions
as a way of probing the relationship between heuristic and
algorithmic processing strategies.
Overall, results confirmed that quantifier scope ambiguous
sentences are not deeply processed during interpretation. The
processing of these sentences is so shallow that even when
stimuli are controlled for, such that all are heavily biased for a
surface scope interpretation, no effect of context was found at
continuation sentences in Experiment 1. Nevertheless, this
changed once questions were asked in Experiment 2. The
pattern of results found in Experiment 2 was that RT data
reflected the lexical-pragmatic bias of context, but question-
response accuracy rates reflected algorithmic computation
(such that ambiguous singular conditions were responded to at
chance accuracy levels). In Experiment 3, RT data for
continuation sentences again did not match the question-
response accuracy rates. Furthermore, the question-response
accuracy rates found in Experiment 3 were almost identical to
those of Experiment 2. The lack of a difference between mean
question-response accuracy rates between experiments was
confirmed via an ANOVA, where no between group subject
differences were found (Fs<1; see Text S14 in File S1).
Furthermore, no between group subject differences regarding
response times were revealed (Fs<1) either (see Text S15 in
File S1). Thus, despite the difference in the lexical-pragmatic
biases of the stimuli, the ultimate comprehension of the
material was identical across experiments (see Text S16 in File
S1).
The fact that the reading times of continuation sentences
reflected the lexical-pragmatic biases of context, whereas
question-response accuracy did not, confirms two hypotheses
put forth in the present article. First, quantifier scope
ambiguous context sentences are processed using two
independent streams of information processing: one that is a
fast and frugal heuristic, sensitive to lexical-pragmatic biases of
stimuli, and another that reflects deeper algorithmic processing,
which is reflective of structural considerations. Second, the fast
and frugal heuristic strategy precedes the application of
algorithmic processing, should it occur at all.
The fast and frugal heuristic clarifies how quantifier scope
ambiguous sentences are processed; these are interpreted
according to lexical-pragmatic biases regarding number and
(algorithmic) scope computation does not occur unless
necessary. In other words, quantifier scope computation (see
1) is not a default strategy for sentences of the form Every N1
Verbed an N2, as that computation is an instance of algorithmic
processing. Thus, processing scope ambiguous sentences is
so shallow that integrating a continuation sentence with a
definite NP anaphor The tree(s)/The diamond(s) is shallow too.
This explains why no on-line RT differences were found for
continuation sentences in Experiment 1.
On-line reading time differences were revealed in
Experiments 2 and 3 because these experiments included
specific questions regarding quantifier scope interpretation. As
such, participants paid more attention to stimuli in these
experiments. However, even when paying attention, heuristic
processing prevailed during on-line reading, so that
continuation sentences in these experiments that were
incongruent with the lexical-pragmatic bias of the context
sentences took longer to read. No effect of quantifier scope
computation was revealed at continuation sentences. Instead,
only when questions regarding scope interpretation were asked
did participants finally do the work of computing quantifier
scope. This algorithmic computation resulted in a pattern such
that inverse scope (reflected in the ambiguous singular
condition) was strongly dispreferred. Question-response
accuracy rates for the ambiguous singular condition were
below chance for both Experiments 2 and 3 (note that the
relatively high accuracy rates for the other conditions indicate
that these college-aged participants were indeed paying
attention).
Thus, the findings confirm the claim made in Ferreira [27]
that sentences are processed using both heuristic and
algorithmic strategies. The present work goes beyond Ferreira
[27] in the following way; first, the variety of the stimuli
examined differs from that studied in other works on
underspecification [36], [38], [54–57]. That is, quantifier scope
ambiguous sentences differ markedly from relative clause
constructions in that semantic, instead of syntactic,
interpretation reliant on rules sensitive to grammatical structure
is examined. This sort of algorithmic semantic interpretation is
also called compositional semantics (see 7–9) as opposed to
conceptual semantics, which is defined as meaning that is
sensitive to the lexical-pragmatic biases derived from
experience in the real-world. Secondly, this work addresses the
issue of the temporal relationship between heuristic and
algorithmic processing strategies. It examines how sentences
are processed in discourse (vs. in isolation), so that lexical-
pragmatic biases from context sentences are evident in reading
time data for continuation sentences, and contrasted with
algorithmic computation, associated with (the later-occurring)
question-answer response data.
The sequential timing of heuristic first, algorithmic later
processing contrasts with proposals made in ERP language
studies [58], [59], [28], [21], where it has been proposed that
these independent processing streams (alternatively called
lexical-semantic vs. syntactic processing streams) operate in
parallel. As discussed earlier, the irony is that self-paced
reading methodology revealed information regarding timing of
processes where ERP methods could not. Again, this is
because the standard slow rate of presentation of words (SOA
of 600 ms) could allow for enough time for first pass heuristic
strategies to apply (this could be in first 200-300 ms) followed
by an algorithmic stage (especially for constructions that are
not underspecified, see 6).
Thus, we can understand the findings of the ERP experiment
investigating quantifier scope ambiguous discourses by
Dwivedi et al. [11] in the following way: the fact that context
sentences were read in their entirety, and under participants’
control (participants pressed a button once they were done
reading the sentence) would allow for these sentences to be
processed in a shallow manner. Then the slow presentation
rate of the words in the continuation sentence enabled
participants to process and integrate the second sentence,
which required going back and paying attention to the meaning
of the first sentence, which could entail computing quantifier
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scope. This difficult task would tax working memory resources,
resulting in a slow negative shift which lasted throughout the
presentation of the auxiliary verb was/were. The slow rate of
presentation could explain why an effect of integration was
elicited in the previous ERP language experiment but not in
Experiment 1, presented here. Effects of integration were
elicited in Experiments 2 and 3 in the present work due to the
presence of questions, which forced more attention to be
placed on the scope ambiguous discourse. Given that the
effects found in the current self-paced studies were regarding
the lexical-pragmatic properties of the context sentence, it
could even be the case that the same was true of the ERP
experiment. That is, it could be the case that the slow negative
waveform was a marker of ambiguous vs. unambiguous
contexts, instead of actual scope computation. Clearly, these
findings open a host of new questions that can be asked
regarding a model of processing semantic ambiguity. What is
clear, for example, is that working memory and attention
resources should have effects in terms of how such sentences
are processed [14].
The effects of lexical-pragmatic biases underscore the
importance of taking into account how number biases are
present for certain events vs. others. That is, just like we have
certain intuitions about plausibility regarding proto-typical
subjects vs. objects (where for example, the former is usually
animate and the latter inanimate) we have intuitions about the
number of participants in events, too. Recognizing the
presence of lexical-pragmatic biases with respect to number for
events is useful because number is employed as a way of
disambiguating quantifier scope ambiguous sentences in
language processing experiments. If this lexical-pragmatic
contribution is not taken into account, it is unclear what one is
measuring, (see also recent work by Patson & Warren [60],
which examined the interpretation of collective vs. distributive
verbs in quantificational sentences).
It is noteworthy that the present work, unlike previous
studies, did not attempt to decide amongst theories of
quantifier scope processing such as the thematic role account
vs. the linear order account or quantifier hierarchy account [61],
[13], [10], [15], [12], because the assumption here is that
quantifier scope ambiguity as a processing phenomenon is not
well-understood enough to decide amongst such theoretical
proposals. Therefore, other basic properties regarding
quantifier scope interpretation need to be better understood
first, before these theoretical proposals can be addressed. For
example, besides controlling for number biases associated with
particular events, another important factor to investigate is the
semantic interpretation associated with the quantifiers in
question, namely a and every. For instance, a N can have a
specific (i.e., referential and thus, non-quantificational) vs. non-
specific (i.e., quantificational) interpretation [2]. As such, if the
quantifier order is reversed, as in A kid climbed every tree,
having a kid in topic/subject position would bias the
interpretation of this noun phrase as referential, and not
quantificational. On a non-quantificational interpretation, there
would be no scope ambiguity. Nevertheless, the number
associated with a kid would still be singular. In other words, the
number associated with a kid on the non-quantificational
interpretation, as well as the so-called surface scope reading
would be identical. As such, if participants choose an
interpretation with one kid and lots of trees, it is not clear
whether the interpretation arises from a pragmatic
interpretation of reference or algorithmic computation of scope.
In the present work (see Tables 1 and 2, as well as Critical
Stimuli Lists in File S1) the indefinite NP a N was always in
direct object position and inanimate because these factors
would bias for a quantificational reading of the determiner a. In
any case, until this is clarified, it is unclear what to make of
studies that examine sentences with the configuration A N1
Verbed every N2 and claim a certain preference for
interpretation (see literature cited above). It has been shown
that interpretation regarding number has a variety of linguistic
sources; as such, these sources need to be teased apart in
order to better understand quantifier scope interpretation.
Furthermore, the semantic properties of every also need to
be understood with respect to processing. Filik et al. [13] and
Paterson et al. [15] made claims regarding a different syntactic
configuration (now quantifier order is varied in two different
kinds of VPs), however, a close examination of their stimuli
reveals that the semantic requirements of every were not met
across conditions. Without going into the details of their
proposal, the important thing to note for this eye-movement
study is that stimuli that took longer to process were
configurations where every did not have a restrictive term. For
example, Filik et al. [13] found that the (underlined) region
containing the two quantifiers (regions are delineated by |
marks) took longer to read for (5b) vs. (5a):
(5) a. The celebrity gave| an indepth interview to every
reporter from the newspaper but | the interview(s) was/were |
not very | interesting.
b. The celebrity gave | every indepth interview to a reporter
from the newspaper but| the reporter(s) was/were | not very |
interested.
Again, it is unclear whether this finding is actually related to
quantifier scope computation. Since every is a strong
quantificational determiner, it requires a restrictive term, or a
context/domain over which to quantify [62–64]. Example (5a)
provides a PP from the newspaper which can serve as the
domain of every, but (5b) does not. Thus, increased RTs for
(5b) could reflect the pragmatic anomaly for every and have
nothing to do with differences in scope computation (see Text
S17 in File S1). Thus, along with the number biases associated
with events, the semantic properties of the quantifiers that are
under investigation need to be taken into account.
In another recent study, Raffray and Pickering [12] claimed
that quantifier scope computation at the level of Logical Form
(LF) could be primed. They argued that given that earlier work
indicated that syntactic analysis could be primed by exposure
to a previous structure (see 65], [66), similar effects should
prevail for structure built at LF. In a picture priming task, they
found that comprehenders’ final interpretation of target
sentences as in Every hiker climbed a hill (note that target
sentences always had the form Every N1 Verbed an N2 ) could
be primed by previous pictures denoting a surface scope or
inverse scope interpretation of quantifier scope ambiguous
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sentences. That is, when a picture depicting singular number
for tree in Every kid climbed a tree was shown right before the
target Every hiker climbed a hill, the choice for a plural
interpretation for tree would drop from 77% to 69%.
In the present study it has been argued that there are two
routes to understanding scope ambiguous sentences. Thus,
whereas Raffray and Pickering [12] proposed that algorithmic
computation can be primed (an argument which seems
plausible) it is entirely possible that effects elicited were due to
a lexical-pragmatic bias for number associated with the
sentences and not due to algorithmic computation. This
alternative hypothesis is especially relevant, given that for all 4
experiments reported, only 12 verbs were used for 24 items in
each experiment, where the prime and the target always had
the same verb. Participants chose the plural interpretation for
target sentences across experiments the majority of the time.
Although Raffray and Pickering [12] never asked why the plural
was so strongly preferred across experiments, it could be the
case that preferences reflected the lexical-pragmatic biases
associated with the 12 verbs that they used. Thus, any drop in
frequency of plural interpretation could reflect a drop in the bias
for the lexical-pragmatic number associated with the target
sentence, rather than the effect of an algorithmic computation
of that sentence. In addition, although participants were asked
about their interpretation of sentences, the interpretation was
presented visually in terms of a picture (event) scenario. It is
not clear that algorithmic computation would be required for
this visual task. Finally, results from their final experiment
strongly call into question the conclusion that any LF
algorithmic computation took place at all. For that experiment,
the prime sentence had plural number overtly marked on N1
and N2, as in Kids like to climb trees (i.e., no scope ambiguity,
no quantifiers were present in prime sentences). Now, choices
for the target Every hiker climbed a hill for plural hikers/plural
hills increased to 84%. The fact that sentences without a
similar syntactic and semantic structure more strongly
engendered a plural interpretation as compared to ones with
exactly the same structure seriously undermines the claim that
priming occurred due to algorithmic computation. Instead, it
seems that when the lexical-pragmatic bias for number is overt,
that is, where both Ns are marked as plural, the interpretation
for sentences of the form Every N1 Verbed an N2 gets a boost
in terms of the plural interpretation associated with N2. Thus, it
seems that the proposal presented in this paper accounts for
the data presented in Raffray and Pickering [12].
Conclusion
In sum, the role of heuristic vs. algorithmic processing
mechanisms was examined with respect to the processing of
quantifier scope ambiguous sentences. These mechanisms are
efficiently co-ordinated such that heuristic processing of these
sentences occurs first and algorithmic ‘deep’ computation of
quantifier scope does not occur in real-time unless it is
required. It was proposed that when examining quantifier scope
ambiguous sentences, the lexical-pragmatic bias of number
with respect to event scenarios cannot be ignored. This bias
can result in a shallow interpretation of quantifier scope
ambiguous sentences with respect to number interpretation.
Deeper processing, reflecting algorithmic computation, occurs
only if necessary. Not only does this model account for results
of the three experiments discussed in this study, it adequately
accounts for other recent findings in the literature examining
quantifier scope ambiguity processing. Furthermore, it opens
up a host of new questions; for example, how do these
mechanisms interact with sentence picture verification (see
Dwivedi, Endicott, Curtiss & Gibson, [67], as well as Dwivedi &
Curtiss, [68], which follow up on this issue).
Thus, it has been proposed that language comprehension
consists of two independent routes—one fast and frugal
heuristic and another slower algorithmic computation. As such,
it appears that the architecture associated with language
processing is comparable to that argued for other cognitive
processes. Furthermore, the importance of timing and
experience in language processing was discussed. Given that
language processing is ultimately a human brain function, the
significance of these factors is expected, as Kutas [69] has
argued that these factors are important in describing brain
processes in general.
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Figure 9.  Mean comprehension question accuracy in Experiment 3 (N=40).  Vertical lines depict standard error of the means,
and the horizontal line indicates an accuracy score of 50% (chance). The difference between accuracy for unambiguous and
ambiguous singular stimuli was significant at p < .001. The difference between accuracy for unambiguous and ambiguous plural
stimuli was also significant at p < .01. **p < .01; ***p < .001.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.g009
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Figure 10.  Mean comprehension question-response time in Experiment 3 (N=40).  Vertical lines depict standard error of the
means.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0081461.g010
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